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Lawrence Lessigt
If you're not a cyberspace maven, but mill around a bit among those who
talk about this cyberspace stuff-if you surf, as it is said, the information
superhighway-there are two questions that you might ask about how this new
space will get regulated.
The first question goes roughly like this: Should this new space,
cyberspace, be regulated by analogy to the regulation of other space, not quite
cyber, or should we give up analogy and start anew?' In Bruce Ackerman's
terms, should we muddle into this new space as ordinary observers, just
applying our old ways of thinking, or should we enter this world as scientific
policymakers, armed with a comprehensive view, structuring the environment
of this world to fit with this comprehensive view?2
The second question follows the first: Is cyberspace really anything new?
Is there really a form of life here that we haven't known before, or is
cyberspace just an electronic version of ordinary space, where the electronics
might add something, but not really very much?
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1. See, e.g., I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace". 55 U. Prrr L REv. 993.
994 (1994) (discussing view that "old analogies just don't cut it").
2. This schema is set out in BRUCE A. ACKERMAN. PRIVATE PROPERTY AND TitE CONSTrI'-nON 10--15
(1977), as the product of two dimensions of opposition. The first dimension ranges between an ordinary
versus scientific perspective on legal discourse and the second between an observer versus policymaking
perspective. In the former, the ordinary perspective believes "legal language cannot be understood unless
its roots in the ordinary talk of non-lawyers are constantly kept in mind" while the scientific belteves that
"the distinctive constituents of legal discourse (are] a set of technical concepts whose meanings are set in
relation to one another by clear definitions without continuing reliance upon the way similar-sounding
concepts are deployed in nonlegal talk." Id. at 10-I1. By contrast, in the latter approach the observer
believes "the test of a sound legal rule is the extent to whtch it vindicates the practices and expectations
embedded in, and generated by, dominant social institutions" while the policymaker believes that the legal
system contains "a relatively small number of general principles describing the abstract ideals which the
legal system is understood to further." Id. at 11-12. The two dimensions together make four possible
approaches---the ordinary observer, the ordinary policymaker. the scientific observer, and the scientific
policymaker. Ackerman's focus in Private Property is on the two extreme ideal types of this matrix, the
ordinary observer and the scientific policymaker. But as I suggest here, what is interesting about cyberspace
regulation is the progression that it suggests through these four possibilities before one gets to the option
of choosing between Ackerman's two types. One might, that is. need (epistemically) to pass through the
ordinary observer stage to build a world within which scientific policymaking is possible. Or so I suggest
here.
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These two questions are interesting, I suggest, not just for what they will
tell us about the regulation of cyberspace. They are significant too for what
they will suggest about the regulation of ordinary space. For they will suggest
what we must know, or where we must be, before we can regulate in ordinary
space with a comprehensive view.
Consider the first question first: Will we regulate by analogy, or by
something else? It should take just a second to see the strangeness in such a
question. For just how could cyberspace be regulated except by analogy? Just
what is it--cyberspace-apart from what we can describe by analogy? This is
not a space that we know, in the sense of a space that we have inhabited.
Indeed, in one sense, it is just a pattern of electrons skimming a net of
computers, a construct that describes a location where a collection of activity
occurs. 3 But described like this, the space could not be understood, or at least
it could not be understood by us. It is understood by us only when we put
things into it, when we carry into it our own language, when we colonize it,
when we domesticate it. It is no accident that we speak of e-mail, or that we
describe postings on "electronic bulletin boards," or that we wonder about the
dynamics of real-time discussions in "CB-chat" areas. We have no choice but
to take control of this space at first with our ordinary terms, if indeed we are
to understand it. And it is through a practice of analogy that this occupation
occurs.
The same point focuses the second question as well-whether there is
really anything new here. For if we will understand this new realm at first by
importing the old, then one way to understand the "new" is just that which
does not fit old ways of speaking. The new will be that which we have to
construct to describe-the gap between our old language and new experiences;
the place where the ordinary observer's language gives out. We will discover
what is new by applying, and falling to apply well, what is ordinary or old to
this new space.
These two points suggest something important about how we should
expect the regulation of cyberspace to proceed. For if the new in this new
space is created as we use up the old, if we do not start with a world to
regulate, but must build it, then what the system of cyberspace regulation will
need is a way to pace any process of regulation-a way to let the experience
catch up with the technology, a way to give the ordinary language a chance to
evolve, and a way to encourage new languages where the old gives out.
This is the practice of the common law. But my plea here for the common
law has little to do with common love for the common law: It is not because
3. Its contours are actually far more complex. For an introduction to various conceptions of
cyberspace, see Michael Benedikt, Introduction to CYBERSPACE: FIRST STEPS 1, 1-3 (Michael Bencdikt cd.,
1991).
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the common law best reflects some truth about the nature of cyberspace, or
that the common law best reflects the customs of inhabitants of cyberspace, 5
or that the common law most efficiently orders the behavior of individuals in
cyberspace.6 What is special about the common law here is its constructive
function. What recommends it is the process that it offers, with its partial
answers, to repeated if slightly varied questions, in a range of contexts with a
world of different talent and ideals. If, as Levi said, the common law is
democratic, it is democratic not because many people get to vote together on
what the law should mean, but because many people get to say what the
common law should mean, each after the other, in a temporally spaced
dialogue of cases and jurisdictions.7 Unlike other lawmaking, what defines the
process of the common law is small change, upon which much large change
gets built; small understandings with which new understandings get made.
What counsels it here is the way this process will function to create in an as
yet uninhabited, unconstructed, world.
Thus in a sense what recommends the common law to cyberspace is not
its efficiency, but its inefficiency. But to praise inefficiency, or better, a way
to slow the regulation of cyberspace down, is not to say that cyberspace will
need no regulation. Nor is it to say that we cannot yet see what the new here
will be. In large part (I think) we can see what will be most important-what
will be best-in this new space. What will be best ties directly to the questions
addressed by this Symposium-associational and speech interests. To say that
we need time to catch up is simply to note the extraordinary gap between what
these associational interests are, or will be, and the world's present
understanding of what exactly is at stake. Put another way, if we had to decide
today, say, just what the First Amendment should mean in cyberspace, my
sense is that we would get it fundamentally wrong.
What is this gap? Let me say something about what these associational
interests will be, and something about the dark ages within which we now live.
What is new, or to be consistent with myself, what will be new in this
cyberspace stuff is not so much the new markets that this space will permit.
They will be important, but they will not be importantly different from the
markets we now know.8 What will be new are the communities that this space
will allow, and the constructive (in the sense of constructivist) possibilities that
4. Cf JOSEPH STORY, THE MISCE.LANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 702 (photo. repnnt 1972)
(William W. Story ed., 1852) (discussing notion of common law as truth).
5. Cf MORTON J. HORwrrIz THE TRANSFORMATON OF AMERXCAN LAw 1870-1960. at 120 (1992)
(discussing view of common law as custom).
6. Cf RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 23-27 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing efficiency
theory of common law); E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence. 85 COLUM. L
REv. 38, 63 (1985) (comparing evolutionary theories of law, including efficiency theory).
7. EDWARD H. LEvl, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 5-6 (1949).
8. Eugene Volokh's account is an excellent prediction. See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and WMat
It Will Do, 104 YALE LJ. 1805 (1995) (predicting future of music, print media, and video).
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these communities will bring. People meet, and talk, and live in cyberspace in
ways not possible in real space. They build and define themselves in
cyberspace in ways not possible in real space. And before they get cut apart
by regulation, we should know something about their form, and more about
their potential.
We know enough to say a little about what these new forms of association
are. They divide into three classes. The first we could call association in
public. Here participants add to a common conversation, but with no real
knowledge about who will read what they write. The best examples of these
are postings to public bulletin boards. Usenet newsgroups are the most
common on the net, where some 4000 different subjects are available for
conversation, 9 and participants either add a new message within a topic or
append a comment to comments previously made. While subjects are to be
self-limiting, there is no formal mechanism for punishing those who violate
subjects. Crossing subject borders may open one up to community
sanction-flamings for violating rules of the Net'--but there are no Net
police who make sure that the proper words fit in the proper place.
What results from this association is a dialogue of sorts, but one very
different, I suggest, from dialogues that we now know. Like a town meeting,
this is a dialogue contributed to by a wide range of people. But unlike a town
meeting, because each response is appended to what went before, there is a
relatively effective constraint to ensure that responses are responsive. Put
another way, there is less return from being nonresponsive than in the drama
of a town meeting. Moreover, because these dialogues go on over time and
with relative anonymity, there is time for reflection and contribution from a
wider range of participants than any single meeting would allow. Here is a
place where discussion produces something, if indeed there is anything to
produce.
A second form of association is more private. Call it an association in
private. It functions like this: People link through the Net and chat (in real
time) with others of their choosing (whether one or many) about a topic (or set
of topics) of their choosing. What distinguishes this kind of association from
the association in public is that this exchange is among known parties, and it
lasts only so long as people are in the room. What is the same is that
conversations are in texts, proceeding responsively.
Because the conversations here are (usually) in real time, the identity of
the conversants is more significant. But identity is not fixed. Depending upon
the service the participant gets to select whether he or she will be a she or he,
9. Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital World: Computer Networks and Cyberspace, 38 VILL. L. REv. 403,
431 n.53 (1993).
10. "Flaming" is a verbal attack in cyberspace. On flaming, see John Seabrook, My First Flame, Nrw
YORKER, June 6, 1994, at 70; see also HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY 36-37 (1993)
(discussing flame wars).
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what he or she does, and so on. The chat room allows individuals a kind of
individual plasticity-like a bar where you select your person before entering
the room-and this plasticity allows individuals a kind of association unknown
in real life. Here the ugly can speak seductively, or the shy can speak-period.
A third form of association mixes something of the last two, adding
collective plasticity to individual plasticity. This we could call an association
in construction. Like associations in public, these associations extend over
time; but like the association in private, at any one time you know (again, as
much as one can know) with whom you are associating, or more simply,
playing. In this form, participants enter a virtual room, the structure and
contents of which are subject to the community's control. The typical form is
something called a MUD, or MOO," where people not only speak, but they
act, or more precisely, emote; where they not only engage in conversation, but
also move around, where they touch, they assault, they construct. Players build
the world within which they will then live, and these constructions survive
over time, for others to play with or to change. This is a world where
individuals not only are individually plastic, but a world where the world itself
becomes plastic.
None of these forms of association is fundamentally new. (Again, how
could they be?) Each has links with older analogs. The association in public
is a kind of electronic town meeting; the association in private is a form of
private club; the association in construction is a form of game or role playing
made concrete in a virtual realm-Dworkin's chain novel, for the common
man.12 But however significant the similarities, we should see enough to
know their potential to be something quite different. How different, how
significant, we cannot yet quite see. We stand in relation to them as Alexander
Graham Bell stood in relation to the telephone. Just as he, however visionary,
could not have understood the idea of a "long-distance relationship," so too we
will not yet understand the significance of these associations in cyberspace.'"
To understand them will require living them, in a world where these
associations are real.
Thus there are these communities, nascent today, of possibly great
potential tomorrow. Yet there is also an extraordinary blindness to this
potential. The blindness comes in two forms, one from the techies who give
us the machines upon which cyberspace gets built; and the other from the
11. "MUD" stands for multiuser dungeon. RHEINGOLD, supra note 10. at 145. A "MOO- is a MUD.
Object Oriented. Katie Hafner Get in the MOOd, NEwswErK. Nov. 7. 1994. at 58-59.
12. Dworkin's chain novel lives in RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EiMPIRE 228-32 (1986).
13. "When Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone, he envisioned sending music over the
wires. 'No one in their right mind, he thought, would tolerate something as intrusive as unannounced phone
calls."' Michael Antonoff et al., The Complete Survival Guide to the Information Super Highway. 244
PoPut.AR Sct., May 1994, at 97, 100.
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regulators, who have their own special blindness to exactly what their
regulation would take away.
First the techies: The same technology that will make possible this
experiment in humanity can also, if allowed, destroy the very essence of what
now defines individuality. I report here a conversation with the computer
system administrator at a major university concerning information available to
users about what other users at the university are doing on the computer
system. As one can imagine, 7000 students and faculty members, plugged into
the Net as they have been for a while, have begun to discover something of
the potential that this world promises; they have begun to practice some of the
forms of association I have just described. Most of this interaction is done
through a UNIX-based machine. 4 UNIX offers users (ordinary users-I am
not speaking of hackers) an extremely powerful ability to monitor just what
others are doing. At any time, any user can type the command "w" at his or
her (mainly his15) console, and the system will report what every other user
of the system is doing at just that moment. On this listing, conveniently
displayed for all to see, is an indication of, for example, with whom others are
e-mailing, or with whom they are "chatting," or, more amazingly, what
newsgroups they are reading. Hit the "w" command, and the system will report
to you that user 123C is reading alt.politics.radical-left, or alt.sex.foot.fetish.
And once you discover what 123C is reading, you can then use the "finger"
function to discover who 123C is in real life, and then, using a phone book
function, find out what 123C does, where 123C lives, and even when his or
her birthday is.
If one can do this once, one can do it repeatedly. So that one could write
a simple UNIX routine to scan the system every five minutes, and collect a
profile of just what everyone is reading, to whom everyone is talking, and
what everyone is thinking.'
6
14. "UNIX" refers to the operating system of the machine, like DOS refers to the operating system
of a primitive IBM PC, or Windows to the operating system of the more recent (and futile) efforts of
Microsoft to mimic the Apple Macintosh. Cf. Andrew S. Rappaport & Shmuel Halcvi, The Computerless
Computer Company, HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1991, at 69, 71 (chronicling Apple/Microsoft
competition).
15. Peter H. Lewis, Exploring New Soapboxes for Political Animals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1995, at
C6 (asserting most Internet users are male).
16. Imagine you wanted to watch what user 123C was doing. The commands you would need are as
follows. First, you would build a file called, for example, "check." The file would have the following lines
in it:
date >> look.list
wlgrep 123C >> look.list
Each of these lines is a UNIX command. The first line executes a command that produces the date, and
then puts it in the file "look.list." The second line executes the "w" command and then pipes the result
through a filter (a function called "grep") that will extract all information related to 123C, and append It
to the file "look.list." Finally, with a command called "crontab," you can set the "check" file to be invoked
at anytime during the hour. Say you wanted to execute the command at the hour, and 15, 30, and 45
minutes past the hour. You would need the following entries in a crontab file:
00 * * * * check
15 * * * * check
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I report this here-among lawyers, among people who for example have
read NAACP v. Alabama'---because I trust this should be quite striking.
Striking since no doubt very few of the users on the system actually realize
that what they read, or with whom they speak, can so easily be monitored.
And striking because the potential for abuse here, especially for vulnerable
groups, is so great. Perhaps more surprising, however, was that the
administrator with whom I spoke just couldn't understand the problem. I was,
he said, the first person who had ever questioned the fact that this information
was available to anyone and everyone. And the first person he had ever spoken
to who even raised the possibility that there may be privacy issues at stake
here.
The "techies" understand the potential of these forms of association, but
it is as if they imagine associations of just techies-extremely smart,
inquisitive, a bit counterculture, but deep down not such a bad lot." They
have known cyberspace longer than we have, but they imagine cyberspace
populated by people other than us. The systems they have given us have
extraordinary potential, but they were not designed to protect individuals
against this extraordinary potential for others to abuse. The invasion of the "w"
command is just one example of a more general problem' 9-the same
technology that makes cyberspace possible also makes it extremely easy to
monitor an increasingly large scope of individuals' lives.
The same technology, of course, can also help restore the privacy
otherwise stolen. Two techniques in particular-in essence the same
technique-allow users some ability to repurchase their privacy. One is the
technique of anonymity, which enables individuals to control what about
themselves is known by those with whom they interact-control, for example,
whether others know a user's name or association or, more generally, any
feature of that individual. The other is the technique of encryption, with which
users are able, in effect, to speak a language that only intended recipients can
understand. Both techniques are the same, for both are simply ways that the
30 * ** check
45 * *** check
So programmed, at 0, 15, 30, and 45 minutes after the hour. the program check would be run. and would
search on the activity of 123C and pipe the results to the file look.list.
I am grateful to Larry Gryziak for outlining the routine for me. I include it here on the pnncaple that
it should exist only if most know about it, and in the hope that if most know about it (and others like it)
it won't exist.
17. 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (striking down statute requiring disclosure of membership lists as violative
of Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment and its protection of right to privacy of association). Of
course the activity of the university in disclosing such information is not proscribed by NAACP. My claim
is just that the interests that motivate NAACP should carry over to the university context.
18. But see Gary Chapman, Barbed Wired, NEw REi'UBuC. Jan. 9 & 16. 1995. at 19 (describing
antisocial, elitist attitude of techie culture).
19. I don't mean to suggest that the function of the "'w" command is necessarily problematic. In a
world where people are not using machines for personal use, the command is legitimately useful. The
problems begin once the machines enter aspects of life in which privacy is critical.
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user can control what about him or her is knowable by others on the system,
whether it be the user's identity, or the meaning of the words spoken. Both
techniques give users the ability to recreate something of the privacy that the
technology would otherwise have taken away.
The techniques of anonymity and cryptography themselves, however, have
given rise to an extraordinary debate among legaloids. For both are getting to
be far too good. Begin with anonymity. Given the range of associations that
I have just surveyed (i.e., newsgroups, chat groups, and MUDs), we can see
many good reasons why someone would want to remain anonymous or
pseudonymous. One wants to contribute to a political discussion without
suffering the cost of unpopular views; one wants to find information without
revealing that one needs that information; one wants to assume a role in a
certain discussion group to explore an alternative identity. All of these are
relatively harmless (to society) uses of anonymity.
Not all anonymity, however, is so benign. Perfect anonymity makes perfect
crime possible. The ability to appear invisibly on a network and slander, or
harass or assault, certainly will increase the incidence of those on the network
who slander, or harass or assault. Thus those who police worry that there may
be real reason to prevent or regulate this technologically granted
anonymity-to license it, or register it, to control how much about oneself one
may not say.'0
The same problem is raised by cryptography. As I have described it,
cryptography is the ability not so much to hide who you are, but to hide what
you say, by encoding it in a way that no one except intended readers can
understand.2' With public key encryption, it becomes extremely simple to
make one's words truly private. 22 Then only with the proper key could
someone unlock these thoughts.
The value of some encryption is the same as the value of some anonymity;
indeed, it may be more pressing: a lawyer speaking to her client; two lovers
on a public network; a purchaser sending credit card information over the Net.
But the costs of encryption are also the same as the costs of anonymity: For
just as there are perfectly good reasons why someone would want to hide her
20. See, e.g., the proposal by Connecticut State Representative Pat Dillon "that would virtually
eliminate anonymity on-line." Beverly Galge, The Babe File, NEW HAVEN ADVOCATE, Feb. 9. 1995, at 7;
see also A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip and the
Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 709, 742-43 (1995) (discussing government positions on encryption).
21. For an extraordinarily complete account of this debate, see Froomkin, supra note 20.
22. With public key encryption, messages require two keys to be decrypted, one public key, and one
private key. With the public key, a user can encrypt a message that then can be read only by the holder
of the private key. See EDWARD A. CAVAZOS & GAVINO MORIN, CYBERSPACE AND THE LAW 30 (1994).
BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 17 (1991). So, for example, a hitman could
advertise his willingness to commit some crime, and publish the ad with his public key. Then, someone
could accept the offer, encrypting the acceptance with the public key, and be assured that only the hitman
could read the acceptance. A separate problem, however, is whether the offeree can tell if the offeror Is
who he says he is.
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or his words from unwanted eyes, there are perfectly evil reasons why
someone would want to do so. Again, encryption makes possible criminal
activity (a conspiracy) without any possibility of the government tracking it
down.
One should not exaggerate the government's or society's loss here. No
doubt it has always been possible for people to find places where their words
can be understood only by the intended recipient. An encrypted conversation
is just the 1990's version of a walk in the park, or a chat on the subway. But
even unexaggerated, the government's fear here is real: With perfect
encryption or perfect anonymity, the return to crime certainly does increase.
And this increase certainly does justify the government's interest in finding
ways to regulate both.23
23. To date, the government's policy with respect to encryption has been to assure the success of its
own encryption technology-the Clipper Chip-which provides encryption for voice communication while
providing a back door with which the government can listen to the conversations it believes it must listen
to. Clipper has excited an extraordinary reaction in the cybercommunity. the vast majority of it passionately
devoted to stopping Clipper. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL. RIGHTS AND REsPONSIBILrflES OF
PARTICIPANTS IN NETWORKED COMMUNITIES 25 (Dorothy E. Denning & Herbert S. Un cds.. 1994); see
Froomkin, supra note 20, at 798 & n.371; see also CAVAZOS & MORIN. supra note 22. at 31 (noting that
Clipper Chip is controversial). The aim, the cybercommunity worries, of the government's policy is to
assure that the only encryption technology out there is the government's, which, the cybercommunity
worries again, means that the government will be in the position to listen to whatever conversations it
chooses.
Subject to two important qualifications. I confess that I don't quite get the fear. If every telephone
in America had a Clipper Chip on it as of tomorrow, there can be no doubt that net privacy in America
would increase. Froomkin, supra note 20, at 742-44. For today, the vast majonty of conversations arc not
encrypted, which means that today, anyone (whether government or not) can tap into and understand most
of what is being said. If Clipper were on every phone, then the only people who could listen to telephone
conversations would be those who have, or could break, the Clipper code. No doubt that since the
government controls the Clipper code, this would tilt the balance among eavesdroppers clearly in the
government's favor. But so what? While it would be easier for the government to eavesdrop than for my
neighbor or competitor or enemy, it still would be extremely hard for the government to eavesdrop illegally.
More precisely, it still would be much more difficult than it is today for the government to eavesdrop
illegally, which would, one should think, decrease the amount of illegal governmental spying, while nearly
eliminating illegal private spying.
What the opponents of Clipper really oppose is a government monopoly on encryption
technology-both because of a (legitimate) fear that the technology of Clipper is not very good. and
because of the concern that only the government holds the keys. This latter concern again seems
exaggerated. Even if every phone had Clipper, one could still encrypt the conversations that the Clipper
Chip would then encrypt again-double encryption, that is. And while the government might someday want
to ban this double encryption, this possibility seems remote, not only because democrats abhor a
government monopoly, but also because it just seems so technically infeasible. See id. at 795. 808. In any
case, that seems to be a battle that should be fought on its own terms, not fought in the context of
government support for a technology that will on balance increase individual privacy. That. it seems to me,
is just what Clipper now is.
As I said at the start, however, there is good reason to be concerned about tlus particular encryption
regime. As Michael Froomkin well outlines, id at 764-93. the present regime provides no real protection
against the improper release of escrowed keys. As he explains, there is. first, no structural assurance that
the Executive could not evade the limitations on access to the keys, and second, no guarantee that a second
copy of all keys is not being held by. for example, the National Security Agency. Assurance against the
second concern is not easy to give. Assurance against the first would exist if. for example. one-half of each
key were given to the judicial branch to hold, to be released only upon the issuance of a warrant. Froomkin
argues this would violate principles of separation of powers. id. at 783-85. because it would be imposing
nonjudicial duties on judges-a violation of the Hayburn's principle. This is. I believe, a mistake. Requiring
that the judicial branch hold the keys is distinct from requiring judges to hold the keys. All sorts of duties
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With both, a constitutional balance will have to be drawn between these
increasingly important interests in privacy, and the competing interest in
collective security. Already the extremes are well staked out, with some
arguing that no regulation of either should be permitted, and others arguing
that only with regulation should either be allowed.24
My point, however, is not about what the balance should be.2Y My point
is about timing-when the balance should be drawn. There are many who now
see the extraordinary expressive and associational potential that cyberspace
offers. Most, however, do not. If the many prove correct, the most will
eventually see the same-as the space becomes more common, as their
children become transformed by it, as life takes root within it. But this seeing
will take time. It will require that individuals gain an experience with this new
space that gives them the sense of what this new space is. Only when this
experience is common should we expect to be in a position to understand its
significance. When the technology, when the experience, when the life in
cyberspace presses us, only then should we expect law to understand enough
to resolve these questions rightly.
To meet this point about timing, I have suggested that we follow the
meandering development of the common law. Let me end by returning to this
theme in the specific context of the First Amendment, to ask how, just now,
First Amendment doctrine should respond.
My suggestion is that it shouldn't. Or at least it shouldn't just now. Or at
least it should do everything it can to stand back from deciding these conflicts
until the nature of these conflicts is well mapped, well constructed, well
understood. A prudent Court-Supreme Court, that is-would find ways to let
these questions simmer for a while, to let the transition into this new space
advance, before venturing too boldly into its regulation. Not that no court
should decide these issues-for again, there is a great value and an important
need for lower courts to wrestle with these questions, if only to create a body
of legal material from which others may draw in considering these questions.
are imposed on inferior officers in the judicial branch by Congress and judges without anyone thinking this
violates the Hayburn's principle. For again, it would be these officers, not the judges, who would
administer the keys, and who would release the keys when a judge issued a warrant. With respect to the
judges, then, giving the keys to the judicial branch would not change their responsibilities at all, but with
respect to the President, because officers in the judicial branch are responsible to someone other than the
President, it would help ensure that keys are not improperly released.
The second concern about the existing regime is the increasing problem of call identification. What
was called pen register information will become much more easily accessible. Pen register information
tracks who called whom when. Given the multiplicity of ways in which people call others (phones, c-mail,
fax), this becomes an increasingly invasive exception to privacy norms. See id. at 762 n.21 1.
24. See the collection of positions in 1994 CRYPTOGRAPHY AND PRIVACY SOURCaBOOK (David
Banisar ed., 1994).
25. Of course, I have my own view. I can see nothing wrong with requiring that all systems attach
encrypted fingerprints on all transactions, such that it is always possible, with a key, to trace a transaction
back to a particular individual, though impossible, without the key, to decrypt the fingerprint to Identify
that person.
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But no court should purport to decide these questions finally or even firmly.
Here especially should be the beginning of a dialogue, which perhaps more
than others is meant to construct its subject more than reflect it. And since it
is easier to correct lower court mistakes, or second-guess lower court
intuitions, it is at this lower level that the dialogue should occur. Constitutional
law is fundamentally concerned with who should decide what constitutional
questions when. My suggestion here is that we rely for the moment on lower
court judges, to give the law the material with which to understand this new
realm.
The point should be especially salient at Alex Bickel's Yale.2 It may
already be latent in the Court's most recent venture close to the boundaries of
cyberspace and the First Amendment, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
FCC.27 In my view the most important passage in Turner comes right at the
beginning, where Justice Kennedy writes:
The role of cable television in the Nation's communications system
has undergone dramatic change over the past 45 years. Given the pace
of technological advancement and the increasing convergence between
cable and other electronic media, the cable industry today stands at
the center of an ongoing telecommunications revolution with still
undefined potential to affect the way we communicate and develop
our intellectual resources.28
Exactly. And what should follow from this "undefined potential" is lots of
room for democratic experimentation. Experimentation, because stable doctrine
is only built upon the ground of long-standing experimentation. What any
review of the history of First Amendment law should suggest is the
contingency of present First Amendment doctrine.29 For most of its history,
the amendment had nothing of the bite that it now has. For most of its history,
it was little more than an aspiration, rarely latched onto by the courts to limit
the democratic (or not so democratic) branches °
Somehow this legal culture got beyond that contingency, and fortunate for
us that it did. Though we live in a post-realist, post-New Deal age, there is
little impatience in First Amendment law with formalisms that other domains
of constitutional law could not account, and little hesitancy in First
26. Best exemplified in ALEXANDER M. BicKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH (1962).
27. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
28. Id. at 2451.
29. See, e.g., Jamie Kalven, Editor's Introduction to HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WoRTHY TRADTON at
xi, xxxi (1988) (discussing relative fragility and vulnerability of First Amendment doctrine), Steven L
Winter, Fast Food and False Friends in the Shopping Mall of Ideas, 64 U. CoLO. L REv. 965, 973 (1993)
(discussing "social contingencies" upon which First Amendment law rests); David Yassky. Eras of the First
Amendment, 91 CoLuM. L. REv. 1699, 1742-44 1991) (arguing First Amendment's strength did not
develop by "gradual progress," but rather "burst out of nowhere").
30. See KALVEN, supra note 29, at 167. 459-61.
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Amendment law to interfere with democrats in the name of the values these
formalisms manifest.
We should take note of this anomaly, stand back from it in a bit of
post-realist awe, and then be very careful to understand the conditions under
which this judicial power has been made possible, and careful about how much
of a burden we can expect this amendment to bear. Already we can see the
structure slowly being drawn into question. Hate speech and pornography
regulations are forcing into the foreground the presuppositions that had
cemented the formal structures of First Amendment law in the first place.3'
These challenges may succeed in dislodging the dominant mode of analysis.
But until they do, we should move slowly in applying the First Amendment
elsewhere.32
Cyberspace is elsewhere, and before carving the First Amendment into its
silicon, we should give the culture a chance to understand it. By "we," again,
I mean the Court. A prudent Court would let these issues evolve, long into this
revolution, until the nature of the beast became a bit more defined. If there is
sanction to intervene, then it is simply to assure that the revolution continue,
not to assure that every step conforms with the First Amendment as now
understood.
Turner suggests there may be such room, though I am not as optimistic as
Cass Sunstein 3 that the room left is indeed very broad. What the Court
should do when turning Turner on cyberspace proper is mark out the deference
even more clearly. While the nature of the domain is so fundamentally
contested, no clear command from the Court should be heard.' Instead, while
31. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993) (discussing defamation,
harassment, and equality in light of First Amendment doctrine); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993) (describing "hard cases" in First Amendment jurisprudence, including
hate speech and pornography); Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124 (1992) (articulating role for Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
in hate speech debate); Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 871, 886-91 (1991) (discussing
hate speech and pornography).
32. To say that we should move slowly makes it sound as if there is an unregulated world, one that
is slowly getting regulated. This is of course false. Cyberspace is regulated everywhere, and its current
faddish appeal will no doubt ensure more legislative regulation. Why not, then, the regulation of the First
Amendment? Or, more precisely, why not apply the anti-regulatory judicial power of the First Amendment
to limit current efforts at legislative regulation? One answer would point to the unruliness of judicial rules
and the unintended consequences of regulation, especially in a world not well understood. See, e.g.,
EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY
UNREASONABLENESS 58-92 (1982). My argument, however, is more about timing and the relative plasticity
of Supreme Court precedent. The scope of judicial protection cannot help but be affected by the common
understanding of the nature of cyberspace. A lack of common understanding will skew this influence. And
because the Court is relatively slow to revise its precedent, this skewing effect may be a significant block
in cyberspace's development. The following comparison may make the point: If the Supreme Court cannot
yet understand the social meaning of the modem American airport, cf International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992) (holding that airports are nonpublic fora), is there reason
to expect that it will understand the social meaning of cyberspace?
33. See Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE LJ. 1757, 1779-80 (1995).
34. I discuss the relationship between contested domains of thought and the possibility of judicial
authority in Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. Rev. 395, 438-42 (1995).
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the nature of this domain is contested, the Court should find ways to let the
contest resolve itself. There will be time enough for principle when the
dealing, associational or not, is done.

